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9.1    Introduction
Entrepreneurship is frequently cited as an important force promoting eco-
nomic growth. There are several possible reasons for such an eﬀect, but per-
haps the most signiﬁ  cant is the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
innovation. We are all familiar with major corporations that began as small 
entrepreneurial ﬁ  rms but that ultimately had a major impact on the business 
environment and on our personal lives. Start-  up ﬁ  rms often innovate long 
before established rivals and therefore speed up economic growth. In the 
computer sector, for example, it seems that the personal computer, which 
has dramatically transformed many aspects of modern life, was due to inno-
vative eﬀorts of entrepreneurial ﬁ  rms such as Apple, Intel, and Microsoft. 
Presumably we would have had to wait much longer if the only sources of 
innovation had been large established ﬁ  rms like IBM, Sperry, Burroughs, 
and Digital (of which only IBM still exists) or the public sector.
Despite this apparent link between entrepreneurial activity, innovation, 
and economic growth, most entrepreneurship is not particularly innova-
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tive and not particularly successful.1 Firms such as Microsoft and Intel are 
interesting not because they are typical or representative of entrepreneur-
ship, but because they are so atypical or unusual. It is not entrepreneurship 
in general that is so valuable for economic growth; it is a small subclass of 
highly innovative entrepreneurial ventures that provide the most important 
contributions. This small subclass of entrepreneurial ﬁ  rms is the particular 
focus of the venture capital industry. Most venture capital activity consists 
of seeking out, investing in, and contributing to innovation- intensive entre-
preneurial ventures.
It is perhaps not surprising that national governments and governments 
of subnational political jurisdictions often seek to promote, support, and 
expand venture capital as a means of promoting innovation and economic 
growth. From an economist’s perspective, however, the case for government 
intervention in venture capital is far from clear. It is certainly not enough to 
say (as many politicians do) that intervention in venture capital is appropri-
ate simply because venture capital might be important for economic growth. 
If economic importance were in itself a basis for government intervention 
then there would be a case for signiﬁ  cant government intervention in all 
major sectors. This would suggest a return to government-  controlled eco-
nomic planning of the sort that many previous studies have suggested is 
ineﬀective. One argument that is often made for interventionist policy in 
a particular market, such as the venture capital market, is the existence of 
signiﬁ  cant market failures that might reasonably be addressed by public 
policy.
This chapter has two primary objectives. First, we seek to describe the 
conceptual foundations of government intervention in the venture capital 
sector. We ask what we would expect to observe if government policy were 
well- structured according to appropriate normative principles. We then turn 
our attention to an empirical analysis using Canadian data. The govern-
ment of Canada and provincial governments within Canada have made 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀorts to expand venture capital activity through a variety of 
policies. Our second primary objective is therefore to assess the record of 
governments within Canada in seeking to promote venture capital invest-
ment, focusing in particular on the eﬀects on value creation, competition, 
and innovation.
There is a substantial body of research (discussed in more detail in the 
literature review) suggesting that problems arising from asymmetric infor-
mation can lead to market failures in the ﬁ  nancing of early-  stage entrepre-
neurial ventures—much more than in other parts of the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
Speciﬁ  cally, one important characteristic of innovative early-  stage tech-
1. Baldwin et al. (2000) ﬁ  nd that, for all Canadian startups between 1984 and 1994, “failure 
rates among entrants are extremely high. Some 40% have exited [their output market] by their 
second birthday. About 75% die by their eighth birthday. On average, mean survival time is 
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nologies or business models is that investors, including venture capitalists, 
typically know much less about them than the innovator, creating a classic 
informational asymmetry of the “hidden characteristics” type. Further-
more, once investment in such ventures is undertaken it is diﬃcult to monitor 
the activities of the innovator so as to infer whether appropriate decisions 
are being made and appropriate eﬀorts undertaken, creating a classic infor-
mational asymmetry of the agency or “hidden action” type. In addition, new 
ventures typically lack the level of collateral and/ or reputation that might be 
used to mitigate market failures arising from informational asymmetries.
Despite these informational market failures, it is highly questionable as 
to whether government intervention can reasonably resolve the informa-
tional problems directly. Governments cannot readily reduce informational 
asymmetries. One approach to reducing informational asymmetries is to 
impose strengthened disclosure requirements (as with the much-  discussed 
Sarbanes-  Oxley legislation in the United States). However, such require-
ments impose costs and are of questionable merit even for large and estab-
lished publicly traded corporations. In the entrepreneurial sector, imposing 
additional disclosure requirements would probably create an excessive and 
unworkable burden for many entrepreneurial ventures.
In addition to this market failure associated with ﬁ  nancing innovation, 
the innovation process itself is subject to market failure of the externality 
type. Innovation, and the research and development underlying it, typi-
cally generate positive externalities. In the extreme, an innovation might be 
easily copied and therefore be almost like a public good. Even patentable 
or copyright-  protected innovations such as computer chips and computer 
software give other ﬁ  rms substantial new information that is useful for fur-
ther innovation. For these reasons, it is plausible that innovation would be 
underprovided. The innovators can expect to receive only a modest share 
of the beneﬁ  ts from the innovation and would therefore lack suﬃciently 
strong incentives to undertake the eﬃcient level of investment in innova-
tion. This potential underprovision of innovation is partially addressed by 
intellectual property policy, especially patent policy and copyright policy. 
However, much innovation is not covered by these policies, and protection 
remains imperfect for those innovations that are covered.
As both information-  based and externality-  based market failure would 
lead to ineﬃciently low levels of entrepreneurial innovation, one possible 
approach to dealing with this problem is to subsidize the venture capital sec-
tor. If the costs of ﬁ  nance in this sector were lowered and the supply of such 
ﬁ  nance were increased, this would increase entrepreneurial innovation and 
would therefore potentially oﬀset the innovation-  reducing eﬀect of market 
failure problems. One argument for such an approach is that relying on 
venture capitalists to “pick winners” and make appropriate investments is 
likely to be more eﬀective than having governments try to pick winners by 
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On the other hand, critics argue that government intervention is itself sub-
ject to informational problems. The government still has to pick which ven-
ture capitalists to subsidize, and this process is prone to error. In addition, 
the incentives facing venture capitalists might well be distorted, as such 
government programs are typically burdened with a variety of additional 
features or conditions that seek to promote other public policy (or po-
litical) objectives that might have signiﬁ  cant economic costs. Government-
  sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs henceforth) might replicate market 
failures that would occur anyway and possibly add new ones. Informa-
tional problems might be ampliﬁ  ed and GVCs might simply crowd out 
more eﬃcient private venture capitalists (PVCs henceforth). In any case, it 
is important to assess the impact and eﬃcacy of government support to ven-
ture capital.
As will be discussed in our literature review, there has been only a mod-
est amount of empirical research into the eﬀectiveness of government-
  sponsored venture capital, and we hope to contribute to this literature. Our 
analysis focuses on the Canadian context, where several government inter-
ventions in venture capital markets have important eﬀects on those markets. 
As described more fully in section 9.3, the quantitatively most important 
government intervention in venture capital arises through the so-  called 
“labor- sponsored” venture capital funds (LSVCCs).2 This program provides 
what is, in eﬀect, a subsidy to a particular group of venture capital funds. 
In addition, a very large provider of venture capital in Canada is a public 
enterprise (or “crown corporation”) known as the Business Development 
Bank of Canada (BDC). Furthermore, various provincial governments also 
provide subsidies through a variety of other programs. We refer to these pro-
grams collectively as government-  sponsored venture capital (GVC) funds 
and compare them with private venture funds (PVCs). The GVCs account 
for well over half of all venture capital under management in Canada.
The basic data on Canadian ﬁ  rms obtaining venture capital is surprisingly 
incomplete. One of the contributions of this chapter is to introduce some 
novel data gathering techniques, including the use of web-  crawlers. This 
allows us to identify more than twice as many venture capital- backed enter-
prises than are reported in oﬃcial or commercially available data sources. 
For these ﬁ  rms, our data contains information on the number and type of 
investors, as well as some basic characteristics such as industry and found-
ing date. We then augment the data by examining a variety of performance 
measures related to the creation of value and innovation by these enterprises. 
However, the data also contains important limitations. Most notably, we are 
2. The name comes from the fact that in order to qualify for the program, the venture capital 
ﬁ  rm must ﬁ  nd a labor organization (normally a union) to act as a formal sponsor. However, the 
labor organizations rarely play any signiﬁ  cant role in the management of these funds.Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital    2 7 9
unable to measure the actual amount of funding provided by the various 
types of investors.
The GVCs, particularly the labor-  sponsored funds, have generated a 
substantial controversy within Canada. One of the most frequently voiced 
criticisms concerns the relatively low rates of return generated by GVCs. We 
would argue that this criticism, while clearly relevant, is far from the whole 
story. The returns to the funds do not reﬂ  ect the full social return on the 
investments. From a public policy perspective, it is far from clear that the 
objective of the program is to create proﬁ  table venture capital funds per se. 
The policy background to the legislation creating and amending GVCs 
includes a variety of objectives, of which generating reasonable returns for 
investors is only one such objective. At the broadest level, the ultimate objec-
tive of the programs is to enhance overall economic performance, focusing 
particularly on the entrepreneurial sector. Investor returns are a component 
of economic performance but other performance measures are also very 
important. This chapter provides an analysis of the performance of GVCs 
with respect to important outcome measures that have not been previously 
studied in this context.
One goal of GVC programs is to develop and support entrepreneurial 
ﬁ  rms that will create signiﬁ  cant value in the economy. Consistent with the 
venture capital literature, we measure this as the value of the ﬁ  rm at either 
an initial public oﬀering (IPO) or a third-  party acquisition. Both of these 
events are associated with successful venture capital investment, as suc-
cessful ventures normally either “go public” with an IPO or are acquired 
by a third party. Either of these so-  called “exit” events signals the end of 
the ﬁ  rm’s life as a stand-  alone privately-  held enterprise and allows venture 
capitalists and other early stage investors to obtain liquidity on their ﬁ  nan-
cial stakes, and possibly withdraw from any managerial functions in the 
enterprise.3 Typically these successful exit events generate substantial earn-
ings for venture capitalists, and possibly other early stage investors, as well as 
for the founders and employees of the venture.4 On the other hand, going out 
of business is typically considered as an unsuccessful outcome. In between 
those two outcomes (successful exits and going out of business) are ﬁ  rms 
that remain privately- held. Therefore, we can reasonably consider successful 
3. Note that the term “exit” refers to exit of the venture capitalist and possibly other early 
stage investors. It does NOT refer to the exit of the ﬁ  rm itself from relevant output markets.
4. Value creation assessed at an exit event is related to the return to investors in venture capital 
funds. However, value creation is a more complete measure of performance than simply looking 
at the return to a particular group of investors (such as venture capital funds). For example, it 
is possible that GVCs provide the extra capital needed to turn potentially unsuccessful ventures 
into successful ventures, thereby increasing the returns to other investors, even if the return to 
GVCs themselves is modest. This value should be reﬂ  ected in the overall value of the enterprise 
at IPO or upon acquisition. Accordingly, it is important to assess overall value creation—the 
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exits as an indicator of success, or we could consider “survival” (successful 
exits plus continuing as a privately-  held enterprise) as an alternative mea-
sure. We investigate both.
A second important goal of GVC programs is to promote innovation, 
although it is hard to measure. We compare the patent portfolios of ﬁ  rms 
ﬁ  nanced by GVCs with the patent portfolios of otherwise comparable ven-
tures ﬁ  nanced by PVCs. While patents are an imperfect measure of innova-
tion, they are certainly the best and most widely used single measure. Eﬀects 
on patents are therefore the natural place to start in assessing the eﬀect of 
venture capital on innovation, although we emphasize that it would be desir-
able in future work to supplement patent information with other measures 
of innovation. As a small ﬁ  rst step in that direction, we examine research 
and development (R&D) spending for ventures that went public, noting that 
these are the only companies for which R&D data is systematically available. 
Yet another interesting aspect is the choice of industry, especially whether 
the investments pertain to high versus low technology industries.
A third goal of GVC programs relates to the promotion of competition 
and of a more “entrepreneurial” economy. New enterprises supported by 
venture capital might or might not provide additional competition in the 
marketplace. Speciﬁ  cally, if a venture capitalist supports an enterprise that 
becomes successful, has an IPO, and continues to grow as an independent 
competitor, this typically increases competition in the relevant marketplace. 
If, on the other hand, an acquisition by a potential or actual rival occurs, this 
could reduce competition in the market. Therefore, we assess the relative 
record of GVCs in supporting the creation of new stand- alone business enti-
ties (thereby enhancing competition) compared with their role in contrib-
uting to acquisitions and thereby possibly reducing competition. In other 
words, we compare the relative incidence of exit by IPO with exit by acquisi-
tion for GVCs and compare it with the record of PVCs.
A fourth frequently-  mentioned goal of GVC programs is employment 
creation, although economists normally express reservations about whether 
employment promotion is appropriately addressed by such policies. In any 
case, we do seek to assess the employment creation record of GVCs. The 
biggest challenge for our analysis is unavailability of data. In particular, our 
analysis of employment creation is limited to the subset of ventures that 
went public, which is a small and unrepresentative sample.
In summary, our analysis examines the empirical relationship between the 
receipt of government- sponsored venture capital funding and the likelihood 
and size of a successful exit event, the enterprises’ innovation activities, as 
well as measures of competition and employment. To provide a brief over-
view of the main results, we ﬁ  nd that enterprises funded by GVCs tend to 
underperform on most outcome measures. They are less likely to have suc-
cessful exits and, in particular, are much less likely to have IPOs on major 
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a successful exit. The GVCs invest less in high technology industries, and 
their enterprises generate fewer patents (even after controlling for industry 
selection). Our results provide no evidence that GVCs increase employment 
or competition.
We recognize that government- sponsored venture capital might be worth-
while even if the associated enterprises are less successful than enterprises 
funded by private venture capitalists. If the problem is that the private sector 
would not provide enough venture capital, then we would want the public 
sector to expand the pool, picking the “next best” set of enterprises who 
would, presumably, not be quite as good as the set selected by the private 
sector in the absence of government support.
It is therefore very important to ask whether publicly supported venture 
capital does add to the pool of supported enterprises or whether it simply 
displaces or “crowds out” private investment. A complete answer to this 
question would require consideration of counterfactuals of what would 
have happened in the absence of government intervention, something that 
we cannot do here. Nonetheless, we examine some indirect evidence that 
suggests there is considerable crowding out but that crowding out is not 
complete. Government VC support might therefore promote modest market 
expansion.
One important issue relates to “endogeneity.” If we observe that enter-
prises supported by PVCs are better than enterprises supported by GVCs, 
this might arise for one of two reasons. Either the PVCs might select better 
enterprises or the PVCs might provide more useful value added to the enter-
prises and might therefore create more success for a given pool of enterprises 
than GVCs. These two eﬀects can be thought of as the “selection eﬀect” and 
the “treatment eﬀect.”
From an econometric point of view, to estimate the “treatment eﬀect” we 
would want to (exogenously) assign venture capitalists to enterprises on a 
random basis and observe the performance of the enterprises. This is not 
how the observations are generated, as the PVCs select the enterprises they 
want to invest in. Therefore, as an explanatory variable for performance, a 
PVC indicator is actually endogenous in the sense that we expect PVCs to 
choose enterprises with good potential to perform well. If we are interested 
in the selection eﬀect, the resulting estimates are interesting. However, if we 
wish to identify the treatment eﬀect then standard ordinary least squares 
(OLS) is compromised by a classic endogeneity problem generated by the 
selection eﬀect.
The normal solution to such endogeneity problems is to use instrumen-
tal variables, if good instruments can be found. In this case we have a very 
interesting and, in our view, very useful instrument that can be used for 
this purpose. This instrument is based on the exogenous variation in the 
political leadership of provincial governments, as explained more fully later. 
We ﬁ nd that the funding by GVCs is related to having left- leaning provincial 282    James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann
governments. Moreover, the negative eﬀect of GVC funding on the vari-
ous outcomes measures becomes even stronger in the instrumental variable 
speciﬁ  cations. These results are at least suggestive of a signiﬁ  cant treatment 
eﬀect for private venture capital relative to government-  sponsored venture 
capital.
Section 9.2 of this chapter contains a literature review of related work. 
Section 9.3 provides a conceptual framework for our analysis. Section 9.4 
describes the venture capital market in Canada, including a review of rele-
vant government policy. Section 9.5 provides an overview of our data and 
section 9.6 is devoted to our empirical analysis and major results. Section 
9.7 contains concluding remarks.
9.2    Literature  Review
We take the view that the primary conceptual rationale for government 
intervention in entrepreneurial ﬁ  nance is based on asymmetric information. 
Informational asymmetries are particularly important in entrepreneurial 
ﬁ  nance and these asymmetries might cause signiﬁ  cant “market failure” 
in the sense that markets would fail to achieve economic eﬃciency. The 
basic theory of asymmetric information was pioneered by Akerlof (1970), 
Arrow (1973), and Jensen and Meckling (1976), among others. Asymmet-
ric information can lead to both “hidden characteristics” and the associ-
ated adverse selection problem, and to “hidden action” and the associated 
agency problem. Early work on venture capital (including Sahlman [1990] 
and Amit, Glosten, and Muller [1990]) emphasizes the importance of both 
adverse selection and agency problems in venture capital ﬁ  nance and, by 
inference, in entrepreneurial ﬁ  nance more broadly. Amit, Brander, and Zott 
(1998) suggest that the venture capital market exists as a specialized com-
ponent of ﬁ  nancial markets precisely because venture capitalists (VCs) have 
or acquire a comparative (and absolute) advantage in dealing with situations 
of asymmetric information. The VCs devote signiﬁ  cant eﬀort to obtaining 
information about particular enterprises and technologies, and often have 
highly relevant technical background experience.
There is considerable evidence that venture capitalists provide a signal 
of the quality of ﬁ  rms under conditions of asymmetric information. This 
is highlighted in the extensive literature on the eﬀect of venture capital and 
underwriting on IPO pricing. See, in particular, Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
Booth and Smith (1986), Megginson and Weiss (2001), Barry et al. (1990), 
Brav and Gompers (1997), and Jain and Kini (2000, 2006), among others. 
The literature on the role of venture capitalists in mitigating informational 
asymmetries in the acquisition process is much more modest (see Brander 
and Egan [2007]). Notwithstanding the ability of venture capitalists to ease 
informational asymmetries, markets for entrepreneurial ﬁ  nance still have 
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ment intervention on this basis. Speciﬁ  cally, we might expect informational 
asymmetries to imply undersupply of entrepreneurial ﬁ  nance relative to the 
eﬃcient or “ﬁ  rst-  best” outcome.
Although we emphasize the importance of venture capitalists in mitigat-
ing informational asymmetries, we recognize that VCs have other important 
functions. In particular, they provide managerial “value added” to the ﬁ  rms 
in which they invest, often providing needed ﬁ  nancial, marketing, human 
resource management, and operations management skills to entrepreneurial 
ﬁ  rms. Papers emphasizing and providing empirical support for this “value 
added” view of venture capitalists include Brander, Amit, and Antweiler 
(2002) and Hellmann and Puri (2002). The role of venture capital in value 
creation has been explored in Hellmann, Egan, and Brander (2005) and 
elsewhere, and is largely complementary to the literature on returns in ven-
ture capital, including Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Jones and Rhodes- Kropf 
(2002), Ljungqvuist and Richardson (2003), and Gompers and Lerner 
(1997), among others. Anderson and Tian (2003) document the poor inves-
tor returns arising from the Canadian LSVCC program.
The second type of market failure that is relevant to government interven-
tion in venture capital markets is the externality associated with R&D and 
innovation. There is an extensive literature on this subject that we cannot 
do justice to here. A valuable textbook treatment of this topic is provided 
by Tirole (1988, ch. 10). The key point is that there is reason to believe 
that innovation might be underprovided because of the substantial posi-
tive externalities associated with it. Much eﬀort has gone into estimating 
the extent of such externalities. One classic study of this type is Bresnahan 
(1986). See also Griliches (1992) and Jaﬀe (1996) for empirical evidence 
concerning the extent of R&D spillovers.
For our purposes, one important question concerns the relationship be-
tween venture capital and R&D. If there is underprovision of innovation, 
does venture capital act to partially oﬀset this underprovision? The litera-
ture on this topic is not extensive, but we would draw attention to Kortum 
and Lerner (2000), Gans and Stern (2003), and Hellmann and Puri (2000), 
which all suggest that venture capital does tend to promote innovation. 
Accordingly, it is possible that a subsidy to venture capital might expand the 
supply of venture capital and might therefore boost innovation toward the 
eﬃcient level, oﬀsetting or at least mitigating the market failure associated 
with insuﬃcient innovation.
The primary question we address concerns the eﬀect of government sub-
sidies to venture capital on economic performance in the form of value 
creation, enhancement of competition, and innovation. We have found only 
a handful of papers that address the eﬀects of government intervention 
on venture capital. Valuable papers in this category include Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2006), Leleux and Surlemont (2003), and Wallsten (2000), all of 
which ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant “crowding out” of private venture capital by publicly 284    James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann
supported venture capital. Such crowding out suggests very limited eﬀects 
from government subsidies of venture capital. On the other hand, Lerner 
(1999, 2002) and Gans and Stern (2003) provide some evidence of success 
for the US Small Business Investment Research (SBIR) program.
9.3    Conceptual  Framework
One important question for our purposes concerns what we would expect 
to see arising from a successful government program. We can then compare 
what we do observe with such expectations. The ﬁ  rst important point is 
that we should not be surprised if GVC-  supported enterprises earn lower 
returns than PVC-  supported enterprises. Consider the following very use-
ful diagram, suggested by Scott Stern. (See also Gans and Stern [2003].) 
The diagram provides a simpliﬁ  ed view of the venture capital market. The 
private venture capitalists have a private upward-  sloping (marginal) cost of 
ﬁ  nance shown in the diagram. There is also an expected private marginal 
return to venture capital, given by the lower of the two downward-  sloping 
curves. We would expect the private market outcome to yield investment 
level VP. However, there are external beneﬁ  ts or “positive externalities” asso-
ciated with venture capital. Accordingly, the marginal social value of venture 
capital ﬁ  nance is given by the upper downward-  sloping line. At the private 
outcome, VP, the equilibrium level of venture capital investment is less than 
the socially eﬃcient outcome given by V∗, where the (private) marginal cost 
is just equal to the social marginal beneﬁ  t. An appropriate subsidy, provided 
through GVCs, could increase the equilibrium quantity of venture capital 
investment to the socially eﬃcient level, as shown in ﬁ  gure 9.1.
An eﬀective program would leave intact the “inframarginal” projects to 
the left of point A on the private (marginal) value schedule and would have 
the eﬀect of adding the “extensive margin”—consisting of projects in the 
range A to B along the schedule. Private VCs would continue to support the 
inframarginal projects and GVCs would support the projects in the extensive 
margin.
If the program worked in this way then the private value or return aris-
ing from the GVC enterprises (i.e., drawn from the segment AB) would be 
lower than the private value associated with inframarginal projects funded 
by PVCs. On the other hand, there is no reason to expect the external value, 
given by the diﬀerence between the upper and lower downward sloping lines, 
to be lower for GVC-  funded enterprises than for PVC-  funded enterprises. 
As drawn, this external value is constant. In general, there could be any 
relationship between private and social value for GVC enterprises. It could 
be higher, lower, or the same. The principle of insuﬃcient reason suggests 
that similar value would be the appropriate “null hypothesis.”
The diagram also clariﬁ  es the crowding out point. A good program would 
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do not add any extensive margin but simply compete for inframarginal 
projects—those to the left of point A on the private value schedule. In the 
extreme there might be no additional enterprises funded. This would be a 
negative outcome, as it would imply that GVC programs create a transfer of 
resources from taxpayers to participants in the market with no correspond-
ing additional social beneﬁ  t.
This diagram also implies that there is no “treatment eﬀect” associated 
with GVCs. As drawn, the private and social value of an enterprise is not 
aﬀected by whether the enterprise is funded by GVCs or PVCs. The diﬀerence 
in return or private value simply arises from a selection eﬀect: PVCs select 
higher quality projects as is consistent with their higher (i.e., unsubsidized) 
return threshold. This implies that any value added provided to an enterprise 
(either private or social) is provided equally by both PVCs and GVCs. How-
ever, it is possible that GVCs might have a less positive “mentoring” eﬀect on 
enterprises than PVCs. If so, this would be an important negative eﬀect of 
GVC programs, particularly if crowding out occurs. With crowding out and 
a negative treatment eﬀect GVC programs would replace PVC investment 
and, in addition, reduce the (private and social) value of the enterprise.
Fig. 9.1    Marginal costs and marginal values for venture capital286    James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann
The key inferences to be drawn from the conceptual framework for inter-
preting our results are as follows:
1.  We should not be surprised or alarmed if GVC-  supported enterprises 
exhibit lower private performance than PVC-  supported enterprises. This 
would be expected under a well-  designed program.
2. We should be concerned if the external (i.e., nonprivate) eﬀects of 
GVC-  supported enterprises fall short of PVC-  supported enterprises.
3.  The extent of crowding out is very important. If GVCs appear to be 
crowding out private venture capital, this would be a negative ﬁ  nding.
4.  If GVCs have weaker private performance than PVCs this could be due 
to either selection or treatment (or both). To the extent the eﬀect is due to 
selection, this is consistent with a good GVC program: PVCs would simply 
have a higher threshold for returns, as we would expect of unsubsidized 
funds. However, if weaker performance is due to a “treatment eﬀect”—less 
eﬀective mentoring—then this would be a negative ﬁ  nding. Therefore, it is 
very important to see what happens when we “correct for” the selection eﬀect 
and focus only on the treatment eﬀect. A poor program would be charac-
terized by a large negative treatment eﬀect and a small selection eﬀect. The 
small selection eﬀect would suggest crowding out—that GVCs were compet-
ing with PVCs for projects that would be funded in any case, and it would 
suggest that GVCs generate lower values when they do replace PVCs.
All four of these points can be assessed empirically.
9.4      An Overview of the Canadian Venture Capital Market
As the Canadian economy is roughly 10 percent of the size of the US 
economy, we might expect the venture capital markets in the two countries to 
be characterized by a similar ten to one ratio. In fact, however, size estimates 
vary considerably for both countries, depending in part on how broadly 
venture capital is deﬁ  ned. The Canadian Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association (CVCA) reports that its members had over C$50 billion of ven-
ture capital under management in Canada in 2007. Presumably the full size 
of the venture capital market, including venture capital from non-  CVCA 
members, would be signiﬁ  cantly larger. To keep things in perspective, we 
might note that Canadian gross domestic product (GDP) for 2007 exceeded 
C$1.2 trillion.
Relative to GDP, population, total R&D expenditure, or other suitable 
measures of economic size and activity, the Canadian venture capital market 
is usually reported as comparable to its US counterpart. If anything, Cana-
dian venture capital markets might be slightly larger than the pro rata 10 
percent share suggested by relative GDP. See Brander, Egan, and Boardman 
(2005) for a discussion of various metrics of this type.
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Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), Industry Canada, the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or aca-
demic papers comes largely (although not exclusively) from one commercial 
source: Thomson Financial Canada, also known as Thomson-  Macdonald 
(formerly Macdonald and Associates, Ltd.). While this is a valuable source, 
its survey methods necessarily yield incomplete coverage and the incom-
pleteness appears to vary systematically by region within Canada. This 
incompleteness particularly applies to non- Canadian venture capital invest-
ments in Canadian enterprises. The methods we use (described in the next 
section) allow for more complete coverage and should not be subject to 
biased regional coverage.
The Canadian venture capital market diﬀers from its US counterpart 
with respect to two important structural characteristics. First, US venture 
capitalists appear to invest heavily in Canada, while the converse is not 
true. Industry Canada (2004) reported that US venture capital accounted 
for approximately one-  quarter of the total venture capital dollars invested 
in Canada between 2000 and 2002. While Canadian venture capitalists do 
invest in US ﬁ  rms, they probably accounted for on the order of 1 percent of 
the total dollars invested in the United States in the same period. If the US- 
Canada border had no eﬀect, and distance did not matter either, we might 
expect that about 90 percent of the venture capital in Canada would come 
from the United States and about 10 percent of the venture capital in the 
United States would come from Canada. Borders and distance do matter, so 
the actual proportions are much less. However, the shortfall is much greater 
in the direction from Canada to the United States rather than vice versa.
Second, there appears to be more government intervention in venture 
capital (and a larger net subsidy) in Canada than in the United States, 
although it is hard to be deﬁ  nitive given the proliferation of state programs 
in the United States and corresponding provincial programs in Canada. 
At the federal level in Canada there are two major interventions. One is 
the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), a government-  owned 
venture capitalist.5 The other major federal initiative is the labor- sponsored 
fund program. The associated venture capital funds are often referred to 
as Labor Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) or as Labor 
Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIFs). The main feature of the program is 
that investors receive a 15 percent tax credit from the federal government on 
their investments, in eﬀect providing a 15 percent subsidy to such funds. In 
addition, some provincial governments add an additional tax credit, typi-
cally an additional 15 percent, making the total eﬀective subsidy 30 percent. 
An individual investing $1,000 would, after tax, in eﬀect be getting $300 of 
5. Baygan (2003) states that BDC accounts for 2 percent of the domestic venture capital 
industry’s capital under management. Bourdeau (2004), in the BDC’s annual reports, states 
that the 2004 carrying value of their venture capital portfolio was approximately $350 million, 
expected to rise to $440 million in 2005. See also Secrieru and Vigneault (2004).288    James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann
the investment money from governments. These funds have been the subject 
of much study, including Ayayi (2002), Cumming and MacIntosh (2002, 
2003a, 2003b, 2006), and Osborne and Sandler (1998). See Sandler (2004) for 
a very thorough account of LSVCCs and other subsidies to venture capital 
in Canada and the United States.
At the provincial level there are both provincially operated funds and the 
provincial equivalents of the LSVCC program. Provincially operated funds 
are particularly prevalent in Quebec;6 however, Ontario, Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan have all had provincially oper-
ated funds that were active in the 1994 to 2004 period.7 Likewise, there are, or 
have been, provincial equivalents to the LSVCC program in Alberta, British 
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan, 
and the remaining three provinces (as well as one territory, the Yukon), all 
have active direct investment tax credit programs. Collectively these provin-
cial programs are often referred to as VCCs,8 although there is consider-
able heterogeneity in the corresponding policies. Typically these programs 
require a variety of conditions that correspond to other policy objectives in 
addition to simply increasing the supply of venture capital, such as job crea-
tion, rural development, economic diversiﬁ  cation, increasing export sales, 
supporting women, aboriginal or other disadvantaged entrepreneurs, and 
promoting community integration.
In addition to government-  sponsored funds, Canada also has the con-
ventional private limited partnerships that characterize venture capital in 
the United States. These funds get much of their resource base from institu-
tional investors such as pension funds, but these institutions have not been 
as aggressive in venture capital ﬁ  nance in Canada as in the United States. 
There are also some corporate venture capital funds, and there is some par-
ticipation in the venture capital market by investment arms of commercial 
banks. In Canada, it is estimated that government- sponsored venture capital 
funds provide over 50 percent of all venture capital invested in Canadian 
enterprises. As a point of comparison, we estimate that the corresponding 
GVC policy interventions in the United States account for approximately 
5 percent of the total invested capital.
Cumming (2006) ﬁ  nds that the Canadian private limited partnerships 
and corporate venture capital funds are analogous to their US counterparts, 
which have been studied in Gompers and Lerner (1996, 1998a, 1998b, and 
1999) and elsewhere. Gompers and Lerner (1999) found that US limited 
6. Of particular importance in Quebec are the various Quebec Innovatech Venture Capital 
Funds and the venture capital subsidiaries of the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec.
7. Examples include the Innovation Ontario Corporation, the Manitoba Science and Tech-
nology Fund, the New Brunswick Innovation Foundation, the Nova Scotia First Fund, and 
the Saskatchewan Government Growth Fund, respectively.
8. Readers should note that VCCs are sometimes referred to as QBICs (Quebec), CBSFs 
(Ontario), CVCCs (Nova Scotia), EVCCs (BC prior to 1998), or SBECs (Alberta), depending 
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partnership contracts provide considerable performance incentives to PVCs 
and change over time to adapt to new legislation and market conditions; 
and Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg (2003) found that non-  US venture 
capitalists perform better when using US-  style investment contracts with 
their entrepreneurs. Cumming (2002) supports this latter ﬁ  nding but notes 
that the tax regime in Canada causes US venture capitalists to alter their 
contracting preferences toward Canadian entrepreneurs, and particularly to 
limit their use of convertible preferred shares.
In addition to the tax credits associated with LSVCCs, investors also 
receive capital gains tax relief, providing that they hold their investment 
for a suitable period, which is generally about ﬁ  ve to eight years (although 
Cumming and MacIntosh [2003a] found that LSVCC returns are “extremely 
poor” and Brander, Amit, and Antweiler [2002] found that their “perfor-
mance signiﬁ  cantly lags” their private counterparts). The LSVCCs are typi-
cally constrained to make investments within their province of registry, and 
sometimes face stage and industry investment requirements.
An interesting institutional feature is that Canada has an active lower-
  tier stock market segment, targeted at “early stage” ventures, called the 
TSX Ventures Exchange. It was formed from the merger of three provincial 
exchanges: the Montreal Exchange, the Alberta Stock Exchange, and the 
Vancouver Stock Exchange. They became the Canadian Venture Exchange, 
which in turn became the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX- VN). This segment 
of the stock market has lower listing and disclosure requirements than the 
main stock market segment (called the Toronto Stock Exchange or TSE). It 
also attracts less funding for ﬁ  rms and provides less liquidity to investors. A 
listing on the TSX-  VN is therefore a less impressive exit event than a listing 
on the TSE, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ).
9.5    Data  Description
The unit of observation in our data is the enterprise (or “venture”). In 
principle, our data set consists of all Canadian enterprises in which one 
or more Canadian venture capital funds had an investment at any time in 
the 1996 to 2004 period. We use a fairly strict deﬁ  nition of venture capi-
tal, excluding so-  called angel investments, mezzanine investments, buyout 
investments, private investments in public entities (PIPEs), and issuance of 
credit.
Figure 9.2 provides an overview of the data collection process. Although it 
is never possible to ascertain this with certainty, we believe that our data does 
capture practically all Canadian venture capital-  backed ﬁ  rms. We obtain 
data on these ﬁ  rms using an iterative search process. We started by compiling 
a list of Canadian venture capital funds from a variety of sources, includ-
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and industry association membership lists, Pratt’s guide, government web-
sites, and legislative reports, as well as forum and network websites. We then 
supplemented this list using custom built web-  bots9 and a human review 
Fig. 9.2    Data collection overview
9. A “web- bot” is a network software tool that consists of four components: a “crawler” that 
retrieves pages from search engines and through hyperlinks; a “parser” that extracts text from 
the HTML; a “knowledge ontology” that is used as a reference framework for interpreting the 
text; and a “reasoning system” that determines whether the text contains useful information, 
with respect to the ontology, and which also provides direction to the crawler. The information 
mined from the Internet by our web- bots was validated against the original source by a human 
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of search engine results. We identiﬁ  ed the venture capital ﬁ  rm responsible 
for each fund, and for each venture capital ﬁ  rm we then obtained a list of 
all the ventures in which the ﬁ  rm had investments from 1996 through 2004 
by going through both their current website (if available) and their historic 
websites (using Internet archives, which are available back to 1996). We 
recorded, where possible, the year that a venture ﬁ  rst appeared in a fund’s 
portfolio, and any other information about the venture and its ﬁ  nancing. We 
then searched on the internet for information about these ventures and their 
ﬁ  nancing histories. These searches were conducted by both web-  bots and 
human agents. The resulting information typically came from the venture’s 
website, press releases, news items, or regulatory ﬁ  lings. From the informa-
tion about each venture we obtained a list of additional investors (including 
American venture capital funds, angel investors, investment banks, and so 
forth). We then obtained additional (Canadian) ventures from investment 
portfolio information about these additional funds. We iterated this pro-
cess until convergence was reached. We believe that our data set is more 
comprehensive than other sources sometimes used. For example, for the 
1996 to 2004 period, we identify 3,720 enterprises. This compares with 1,763 
enterprises meeting our criteria identiﬁ  ed by Thomson Financial for the 
same period.
Conveniently, it is relatively easy to classify venture capital funds into 
government- sponsored or private categories. Government- sponsored funds 
include all LSVCCs, the BDC, all VCCs, and venture capital funds operated 
by provincial governments. We can therefore distinguish among enterprises 
receiving investments from private funds, from government-  sponsored 
funds, or from both.
Given the list of venture-  backed enterprises, we then identiﬁ  ed IPOs and 
acquisitions for these enterprises. Documentation was taken from the Sys-
tem for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) and Strate-
gies in Canada and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the 
United States, as well as from press reports and other public disclosures 
(again gathered by web-  bots), and cross-  checked against data from the FP 
Advisor, Global New Issues, and SDC Mergers and Acquisitions databases. 
In the case of multiple exits for a single enterprise, such as a listing on a 
junior exchange followed by an upgrade to a senior exchange, we took the 
ﬁ  rst event where the venture capitalists had the opportunity to exit, unless 
there was evidence to suggest that they retained their holdings in the ﬁ  rm. 
For further information of the determination of our exit set see Hellmann, 
Egan, and Brander (2005).
Venture founding year information and some address information was 
also taken from Strategis for those ventures that were federally incorporated. 
Furthermore, additional addresses and the operational status of the ﬁ  rms 
in 2006 were determined by custom data-  mining software designed to work 
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the ﬁ  rm’s website. Investments from US venture capitalists into Canadian 
enterprises were recorded from Thomson VentureXpert. Canadian patent 
data was retrieved by custom data- mining software from the Canadian Intel-
lectual Property Oﬃce’s (CIPO) online repository. We searched for multiple 
variations on each ﬁ  rm name and matched the results back using propri-
etary name-  matching software. The US patent data was obtained from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research patent data, as described in Hall, 
Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2001), and joined using name-  matching software. 
Measures of patent citations received and patent originality were averaged 
on a per ﬁ  rm basis.
Table 9.1 shows the discrete or indicator variables ﬁ  rst. The ﬁ  rst row 
should be read as saying that we have an indicator variable called “PVC.” 
This is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for enterprises that 
received venture capital only from private VC funds and 0 otherwise. There 
are 3,720 enterprises in the data set overall. This variable takes on value 1 
for 1,208 (32 percent) of these, indicating that 1,208 enterprises received 
venture capital only from private funds. Similarly, the GVC variable tells 
us that 1,784 (48 percent) of the enterprises received venture capital only 
from government-  sponsored venture capital funds. The remaining 728 (20 
percent) of the enterprises received venture capital investments from both 
private and government- sponsored funds. We call these MVC, meaning that 
the company has a mix of private and government- sponsored venture funds. 
The variables number of PVC and number of GVC measure the number 
of each investor type participating in a venture. We ﬁ  nd that the average 
venture had 1.32 GVCs and 0.85 PVCs. The variable number of VC simply 
measures the total number of investors for a given enterprise. Finally, for the 
analysis it will be useful to work with the fraction of venture funds that are 
government- sponsored, as measured by fraction of GVC, which is obtained 
as the ratio of number of GVC over number of VC.
To be in the data set, an enterprise simply needed to be in the investment 
portfolio of one or more venture capital funds at some time in the 1996 to 
2004 period. This includes some enterprises that received investments prior 
to 1996. Of these 3,720 enterprises, 408 (about 11 percent) had a “successful” 
exit event over the period studied. In future years more of these enterprises 
will of course have IPOs or be acquired by third parties. Our empirical 
analysis attempts to control for this censoring problem in a simple manner, 
namely by including founding year eﬀects (see the following).10 Figure 9.3 
10. To get an estimate of long- run outcomes we might, for example, look at what happens by 
ﬁ  ve years after ﬁ  rst venture capital investment. This is not shown in table 9.1 (which includes 
all enterprises). Applying such a metric to our data suggests that, as of ﬁ  ve years after ﬁ  rst 
investment, about 10 percent of venture-  supported enterprises have an IPO, about 25 percent 
are acquired by a third party, about 45 percent go out of business, and the remainder either 
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shows the frequency distribution of the ventures’ founding year over the 
sample period. Consistent with previous observations of the venture capital 
market, the period 1999 to 2000 witnessed the largest number of venture 
capital- backed  ﬁ  rm foundings.
The successful exits consist of 293 acquisitions (129 of which are by 
publicly-  traded US ﬁ  rms) and 115 IPOs. The IPOs can be divided into 
“junior” and “senior” categories. Junior IPOs are IPOs on exchanges that 
specialize in small, relatively early stage IPOs, most of which are on the TSX 
Venture Exchange (or its predecessors). Senior IPOs are larger IPOs on 
larger exchanges, mostly the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). Some senior 
IPOs are on the NYSE or the NASDAQ. As can be seen in table 9.1, the 
median senior IPO is almost ten times the size of the median junior IPO. 
However, some junior IPOs are larger than some senior IPOs, and the larg-
est junior IPO is on the same order of magnitude as the median senior IPO. 
Figure 9.4 shows the frequency distribution of IPOs and M&As over the 
sample period. It shows that IPOs followed the familiar boom and bust 
cycle with a peak in the 1999 to 2000 period. Interestingly, M&As show a 
considerably smoother path over time.
An enterprise is deﬁ  ned as “out of business” if it had not had a success-
ful exit and could no longer be found in the appropriate Yellow Pages as 
of 2006 or through other means. Using this deﬁ  nition, 40.7 percent of the 
enterprises in the sample survived (i.e., did not go out of business) within 
the sample period (i.e., by 2006). This reﬂ  ects an important reality associ-
ated with venture capital investment. Even though venture capitalists are 
highly specialized in selecting and mentoring innovative enterprises, most 
investments either lose money outright or earn less than what would have 
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been earned by investing in Government of Canada bonds or other very 
safe assets. Most of the return to venture capitalists comes from a relatively 
small number of enterprises that are successful enough to have IPOs or to 
be acquired by a third party.
An important question is, what kind of enterprises receive venture capital? 
One of the reasons for supporting venture capital is to address market fail-
ures associated with asymmetries of information; another is the promotion 
of innovative activity. Both of these are widely believed to be associated with 
high technology ﬁ  rms. We deﬁ  ne high technology to consist of both infor-
mation technology (IT) and biotechnology, both of which are in turn de-
ﬁ  ned using six- digit North American Industry Classiﬁ  cation (NAIC) codes. 
This NAIC based deﬁ  nition of high-  technology is broadly consistent with 
that of Hecker (2005). See Brander and Egan (2007) for a detailed descrip-
tion of these two industry classiﬁ  cations and their NAIC code correspon-
dence. The remaining industries were deﬁ  ned in terms of single- digit NAIC 
codes. However, given the relatively small number of exits (and investments) 
in some industries, it is necessary to do some agglomeration. Speciﬁ  cally, we 
combine all single-  digit industries with fewer than 100 enterprises into one 
of two categories: primary sectors consisting of NAIC codes 1 and 2, and 
tertiary sectors, or service industries, consisting of NAIC codes 6 through 9. 
Of the 3,720 enterprises in our sample, we have industry classiﬁ  cations (six-
  digit NAIC codes) for 2,832 (about 76 percent). Of these 2,832 enterprises, 
1,226 (about 33 percent) are in what we describe as the “high-  tech” sector.11 
Fig. 9.4    Frequency distribution of exits by IPO and M&A
11. Brander and Egan (2007) provide a deﬁ  nition of IT in terms of six-  digit NAIC codes as 
follows: 333295, 334111, 334112, 334113, 334119, 334210, 334220, 334290, 334413, 334611, 296    James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann
Our regression analysis includes speciﬁ  cations with industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects, 
represented by single-  digit NAIC code groups, as well as a code for IT and 
another for biotechnology, as control variables.12
Figure 9.5 shows the distribution of venture capital investments by indus-
try, and also indicates the relative proportions of private, government, and 
mixed investors. To further explore how these types of investors focus on 
diﬀerent industry sectors, we estimate a simple multinomial logit model, 
where the dependent variables are GVC (with the omitted category being 
PVC) and “PVC and MVC” (with the omitted category being GVC), and 
where the independent variables are the industry dummies. This simple 
regression estimates the likelihood that ﬁ  rms in a given sector obtain govern-
ment or mixed/ private investors, and table 9.2 presents the results in descend-
ing order of the estimated regression coeﬃcient. Thus, this regression orders 
the relative importance that diﬀerent investors have in diﬀerent industries. 
The results are striking. Government-  sponsored venture capital ﬁ  rms have 
a preference for lower technology industries, such as resource extraction 
and manufacturing. The major high-  technology areas of information tech-
nology and biotechnology, however, are lowest on the list of relative industry 
preferences. This ranking is essentially reversed for the mixed and private 
investor category, suggesting that syndication between private and govern-
ment investors is particularly likely in the high technology sector. We will 
return to this ﬁ  nding in section 9.5.4.
Our data has several notable deﬁ  ciencies. Most important, we were unable 
to gather any systematic information on the amount of capital invested by 
venture capitalists. Some of that information is available in the commercial 
database provided by Thomson Financial Canada, but there are two major 
problems with that data source. First, some industry experts have argued 
that the data contains some inconsistencies and measurement errors. Sec-
ond, as noted before, the Thomson Financial Canada data appears to have 
an incomplete and biased coverage of the population of Canadian venture 
capital- backed  ﬁ  rms. We attempted to independently collect data on the 
investment amount, including for those enterprises not covered in Thomson 
Financial. However, this attempt failed because our alternative sources of 
information, such as web pages, do not contain systematic and reliable infor-
mation on investment amounts. Similar problems also explain the lack of 
other data that would have been of interest to the analysis, such as the valu-
ation of the venture capital investments, or the post- investment involvement 
of venture capitalists in the enterprise (e.g., board seats, control rights, etc.). 
335921, 423430, 425110, 443120, 511210, 516110, 517110, 517212, 517410, 517910, 518111, 
518210, 519190, 541511, 541512, 541513, 541519, 611420, and 811212. Biotechnology is deﬁ  ned 
as follows: 325411, 325412, 325413, 325414, 541710, and 621511. Note that biotechnology is 
particularly diﬃcult to deﬁ  ne using the NAIC system.
12. Speciﬁ  cally we use single- digit NAIC codes 1 and 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 through 9, IT, Biotech, and 
zero as industry controls, where zero indicates that the industry classiﬁ  cation is missing.Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital    2 9 7
We also face other severe data limitations. Our only measure of employment 
comes from IPO prospectuses, and therefore is available only for a tiny frac-
tion of ventures. A similar problem holds for our R&D intensity measure. 
Another important limitation is that we were unable to collect reliable mea-
sures of the total size of the government subsidy. Moreover, we were unable 
to systematize any changes in the more detailed rules that aﬀect the attrac-
tiveness of the government subsidies. Despite our best eﬀorts, we were also 
unable to always obtain complete information on industry classiﬁ  cation and 
Fig. 9.5    Venture capital investments by industry and type
Table 9.2  Relative ranking of industry preferences from multinomial 
logit regression
  Ranking   Government-  sponsored VC (GVC)   Coeﬃcient 
1 Farming, resources, and utilities 0.293
2 Manufacturing 0.200
3 Retail, wholesale, transportation, and logistics 0.027
4 Other and unclassiﬁ  ed 0.000
5 Finance and media –0.302
6 Biotechnology –0.318
7 Information technology   –0.668
  Mixed (MVC) and Private VC (PVC)   Coeﬃcient
1 Biotechnology 2.202
2 Information technology 1.598
3 Manufacturing 1.355
4 Retail, wholesale, transportation, and logistics 0.992
5 Finance and media 0.897
6 Farming, resources, and utilities 0.786
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the ﬁ  rst year of ﬁ  nancing. We continue to include the associated observa-
tions in our analysis by categorizing them into a distinct dummy category. 
We note that our data is fundamentally cross- sectional (one observation per 
enterprise), so we cannot perform any panel-  based analysis.
9.6    Analysis  and  Results
9.6.1      Choice of Empirical Speciﬁ  cation
Our primary method of analysis is based on regression analysis as imple-
mented by STATA 10. As a ﬁ  rst step for the analysis, we focus on charac-
terizing the relationship between investor types and outcome variables. It is 
important to remember that the investor type is clearly not exogenous, so 
no causation should be inferred from these regressions. Wherever possible, 
we use the “robust” option, which corrects for heteroskedasticity using the 
Huber/ White/ sandwich adjustment. We report t or z statistics as is appropri-
ate, along with their p- values.
There are multiple regression speciﬁ  cations that elucidate diﬀerent as-
pects of the underlying data. In table 9.3 we therefore consider one of the 
most important performance measures—namely, whether a company expe-
rienced a successful exit or not—and explore the meaning of a variety of 
regression speciﬁ  cations. The dependent variable is a categorical variable 
taking on value 1 if a successful exit occurred and value 0 if it did not. 
Accordingly, we use probit regressions to estimate the eﬀect of diﬀerent 
types of venture capital funds.
We distinguish between two diﬀerent approaches of representing investor 
types. The ﬁ  rst is a categorical approach, and divides venture-  backed ﬁ  rms 
into three types: ﬁ  rms that only receive private venture capital (PVC)—
we will use them as our omitted default category; ﬁ  rms that only receive 
government-  sponsored venture capital (GVC); and ﬁ  rms that receive a mix 
of the two (MVC). The categorical approach has the advantage of being easy 
to interpret, although the simple categories do not exploit the full amount 
of information available. We therefore also consider a continuous variable 
approach that uses more of the available information. In particular, we cal-
culate the fraction of a company’s investors that are government sponsored. 
Note that in an ideal world, we would want to use the fraction of money 
received from GVCs, but unfortunately we do not have suﬃciently reliable 
investment data to undertake that approach. Table 9.3 contains two sepa-
rate row sections, one for the categorical and one for the continuous vari-
able approach.
The columns of table 9.3 contain a variety of alternative speciﬁ  cations for 
the control variables. The ﬁ  rst column reports the model without any control 
variables. We ﬁ  nd that having only government-  sponsored VC has a nega-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.300    James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann
having both government and private VCs actually increases the probability 
of a successful exit. This result may seem surprising at ﬁ  rst. Before placing 
any interpretation on this result, we need to realize a fundamental prob-
lem: better ventures are likely to raise more rounds of investment involving 
a greater number of investors and so would have a greater likelihood of 
receiving investment from a GVC. This means that, for purely mechanical 
reasons, better ventures that attract more investors are more likely to end 
up in the MVC category. Column (2) addresses this problem by adding a 
control for the number of investors. We ﬁ  nd that this alone eliminates the 
signiﬁ  cance of the MVC coeﬃcient. We naturally have to be careful not 
to give a causal interpretation to the number of investors variable: having 
more investors may improve a company’s performance, but better ventures 
also attract more investors. This speciﬁ  cation therefore allows us to focus 
on how the type of investor is related to outcomes, after controlling for 
the obvious positive relationship between performance and the number of 
investors. The continuous variable approach, using the fraction of govern-
ment investors, provides further evidence that controlling for the number of 
investors may be important (especially in the categorical speciﬁ  cation). We 
note that the number of investors variable is again highly signiﬁ  cant, but 
that the fraction of GVC variable is hardly aﬀected by its introduction. This 
suggests that the investor type variables (either GVC and MVC, or fraction 
of GVC) measure a diﬀerent eﬀect than the number of investors; that is, 
these variables separate out the investor type eﬀect from an enterprise qual-
ity eﬀect. Note that, obviously, the number of investors is far from being a 
perfect control for enterprise quality. In unreported robustness checks we 
replaced this variable with an estimate of the number of rounds obtained 
by the enterprise. Because of data limitations, we are unable to provide a 
precise estimate of the number of rounds, but we are able to establish an 
upper and a lower bound. Using either of these alternative control variables 
yields very similar results.
It seems natural to also control for calendar time eﬀects. We therefore 
introduce a set of dummy variables that indicate the year of founding for the 
enterprise or, if that is not available, the earliest year in which the enterprise 
received venture capital. If this occurred before 1996 we do not have the 
exact year and code the enterprise with an indicator code meaning “before 
1996.” This year variable sometimes used a control variable. As we recall, 
the period 1996 to 2004 covers a stock market (and IPO) boom in the ﬁ  rst 
few years, a “crash” in 2000 to 2002, and a subsequent recovery. Accord-
ingly, we might expect that simple timing might have a signiﬁ  cant impact on 
exit valuations and on other performance measures. We would not want to 
attribute to a new venture capital support program losses associated simply 
with this stock market cycle. We therefore condition on timing to avoid this 
problem. The founding date controls also help to account for the fact that 
exit events are right-  censored. Columns (3) and (4) of table 9.3 report the Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital    3 0 1
results of adding year ﬁ  xed eﬀects, ﬁ  rst without and then with the number of 
investors control. We ﬁ  nd that year ﬁ  xed eﬀects have relatively little impact 
on our results.
Columns (5) and (6) report the results of adding industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects. If 
one wants to get an idea of the unconditional performance of the diﬀerent 
investor types, it can be useful not to control for industry. This is because 
from an investor perspective, choosing the right industries is part of the 
investment challenge. In this chapter, however, we focus on the eﬀect that 
diﬀerent investor types have on the performance of venture-  backed ﬁ  rms. 
Thus, it is natural to control for the fact that performance metrics, such as 
the probability of a successful exit, may vary across diﬀerent industries. 
We already noted in section 9.4 that the diﬀerent types of venture capital 
ﬁ  rms have marked diﬀerences in their preference for investing in diﬀerent 
industries. Not surprisingly, we ﬁ  nd that the addition of industry controls 
has some eﬀect on the main dependent variables. In particular, we note that 
the MVC variable loses signiﬁ  cance. This is mostly due to the fact that the 
exit rate is highest in the high technology sectors (IT and biotechnology). 
Interestingly, we note again that the fraction of GVC variable is robust and 
remains negative and signiﬁ  cant.
Columns (7) and (8) ﬁ  nally consider the model with both year and indus-
try ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Because column (8) has the most complete set of control 
variables, it will become the default speciﬁ  cation for the remainder of the 
analysis.
9.6.2      The Relationship between Investor Types 
and Performance Measures
As noted in the introduction, one important measure of performance 
for early stage investors concerns whether the venture has a major valua-
tion event—an IPO or a third-  party acquisition. A majority of enterprises 
in our sample did not have such a valuation event in the period studied. 
Therefore, one basic question concerns whether private venture capital or 
public venture capital funds were more likely to generate positive exit events. 
Column (1) of table 9.4 repeats the results from column (8) of table 9.3, 
showing that the presence of GVCs is associated with a lower probability 
of successful exit.
A second measure of the performance of venture-  backed enterprises is 
simply survival. Accordingly, column (2) shows how having diﬀerent types 
of investors is related to survival. The coeﬃcients for GVC and fraction of 
GVC are negative but not statistically signiﬁ  cant.
The next performance measure we consider is the value of the enterprise 
at exit. We use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where the depen-
dent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the exit value. For all 
venture- backed ﬁ  rms that did not experience a successful exit we set the exit 
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an enterprise going out of business may still have a small residual value not 
observable to us. Second, the sample contains a number of enterprises that 
have not yet had a chance to realize their true value in an exit event. To at 
least partially address this, we consider three alternative sample speciﬁ  ca-
tions. Column (3) includes all ﬁ  rms, irrespective of whether they survived or 
had an exit. Column (4) considers the sample of ﬁ  rms for which a resolution 
has occurred; that is, ﬁ  rms that either had a successful exit, or else have gone 
out of business. Column (5) only considers ﬁ  rms that have experienced a suc-
cessful exit. The three speciﬁ  cations use diﬀerent conditioning criteria, and 
therefore provide alternative perspectives. Interestingly, the eﬀect of investor 
types remains quite similar across all three speciﬁ  cations, although the statis-
tical signiﬁ  cance becomes weaker the smaller the sample. Overall, however, 
we note that the presence of GVCs is associated with lower exit values.
Column (6) of table 9.4 contains one more variable that is only indirectly 
related to value creation. The dependent variable is a categorical variable 
that takes the value 1 if the enterprise received investment from US inves-
tors, and zero otherwise. The idea is that attracting US ﬁ  nancing is both 
an indicator of the ﬁ  rm having good prospects and contributes directly to 
enhanced value. We ﬁ  nd that enterprises with a higher fraction of GVC are 
less likely to attract US investors—the GVC coeﬃcient in the categorical 
speciﬁ  cation is marginally insigniﬁ  cant at 12 percent.
Overall, we notice that there is no evidence that GVC outperforms PVC 
and some signiﬁ  cant evidence to the contrary: that PVC outperforms GVC. 
We now turn to examining other outcome variables, especially related to 
innovation.
Turning to table 9.5, the ﬁ  rst two columns examine the relationship 
between Canadian patents and investor types. Column (1) considers a pro-
bit speciﬁ  cation where the dependent variable is a categorical variable that 
takes the value 1 if the enterprise has at least one Canadian patent, and 
zero otherwise. Column (2) uses a count variable of Canadian patents and 
estimates a negative binominal regression model. We note that the presence 
of GVC is associated with a lower propensity to patent. Columns (3) and 
(4) perform equivalent regressions for US patents. Interestingly, we ﬁ  nd that 
none of the investor type variables are statistically signiﬁ  cant.
In addition to counting patents, one may want to look at the “quality” 
of those patents too. Prior research has established a number of patent 
quality measures, such as forward citations or patent originality. This data 
is only available for US patents, and these measures can only be calculated 
for enterprises that have patents. In unreported regressions we investigated 
the relationship between investor type and these patent quality measures, 
but found no statistically signiﬁ  cant relationships. However, we refrain from 
providing a strong interpretation on this ﬁ  nding, given the severe limitations 
of the data.
One fundamental limitation of patent data is that patents only cap-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital    3 0 5
 protected (at least partially) against appropriation. Unfortunately there is no 
readily available data on innovation externalities. The only other innovation 
measure available to us concerns R&D spending. Unfortunately, only stock 
market listed ventures report this data, so we relied on IPO prospectuses. 
We construct a measure of R&D intensity, deﬁ  ned as the amount of R&D 
spending per employee. Column (5) of table 9.5 reports the result, showing 
negative but statistically insigniﬁ  cant coeﬃcients for all the government-
  sponsored variables. We obtained similar results when using absolute levels 
of R&D spending, or normalizing R&D spending by total assets.
Probably one of the most frequently stated government objectives for 
subsidizing venture capital is employment creation. Again we face a serious 
data collection problem, as only stock market listed ventures publicly report 
employment ﬁ  gures. Column (6) of table 9.5 reports the results for regressing 
employment in these ﬁ  rms on their investor types. The GVC coeﬃcients are 
insigniﬁ  cant. Again, we refrain from providing a strong interpretation of 
these results, given the extreme limitations of the available data.
Overall, these results cast a doubt on the argument that there is an innova-
tion externality that compensates for the lower performance of enterprises 
backed by government-  sponsored VC ﬁ  rms.
Another interesting but diﬃcult to measure policy objective relates to the 
promotion of competition and an entrepreneurial economy. The previous 
analysis of exit performance grouped together diﬀerent types of exits that 
represent diﬀerent ownership structures, which are likely to be correlated 
with diﬀerent degrees of competitiveness. Therefore, we now have a more 
detailed look at the diﬀerent types of exit mechanisms. As previously men-
tioned, the IPO market is divided into two segments, the senior exchanges 
(which signal that an enterprise has achieved a certain maturity and viabil-
ity), and the junior exchanges, (which do not guarantee either maturity or 
viability of the enterprise). Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) naturally rep-
resent the third type of exit. The ﬁ  rst three columns of table 9.6 report the 
results of a multinomial logit speciﬁ  cation. The omitted category is ventures 
that have not experienced an exit. Column (1) reports the coeﬃcients for 
M&A outcomes, column (2) for junior IPOs, and column (3) for senior IPOs. 
The most important pattern to recognize is that ﬁ  rms backed by government 
VCs are much less likely to get acquired. As for junior and senior IPOs, the 
coeﬃcients for government VC are statistically insigniﬁ  cant. This result lays 
the groundwork for the main question of interest, whether there is a relation-
ship between types of VC and competition.
The type of exit event is likely to be correlated with the ﬁ  rm’s competitive 
impact. Firms that achieve the size and maturity of being able to undertake a 
senior stock market listing may be viewed as successful new entrants in their 
industries. This cannot be taken for granted for ﬁ  rms listing on the junior 
exchanges, where the fundamental market viability of the ﬁ  rm typically 
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that considers senior IPOs as procompetitive and junior IPOs as less com-
petitive. It is important to note, however, that this is not a direct measure 
of the competitive impact generated by these ﬁ  rms. Instead, the measure 
consists of what might be considered a reasonable but imperfect interpreta-
tion of exit events. The measure is imperfect for two reasons. First, it only 
captures average tendencies; there may by some junior-  market listed ﬁ  rms 
that have a more procompetitive impact than some of the senior-  market 
listed ﬁ  rms. Second, we only measure the competitive impact at the time of 
exit, but a ﬁ  rm’s status may subsequently change.
Probably the biggest challenge for our measure of competitive impact 
concerns mergers and acquisitions. In general it is diﬃcult to say whether 
such an exit event increases or decreases competition, since this depends 
crucially on who the acquirer is. Conceptually we want to distinguish 
between acquisitions by industry insiders, which indicate a less competitive 
outcome, and acquisitions by industry outsiders, which signify entry of the 
acquirers into the target ﬁ  rms’ industries, and can thus be thought of as 
procompetitive. Empirically we attempt to distinguish insider and outsider 
M&As by comparing the industry classiﬁ  cations of the acquirer and target 
ﬁ  rms. For this analysis to be meaningful we need to choose an industry 
deﬁ  nition that is neither too wide nor too narrow, and we settle on the ﬁ  ve-
  digit NAIC deﬁ  nition for an industry.13 Speciﬁ  cally, we classiﬁ  ed an exit by 
M&A as less competitive when the acquirer had the same ﬁ  ve-  digit NAIC 
code, and procompetitive otherwise. Again, we consider this as an indirect 
and imperfect measure, but a useful proxy for measuring the competitive 
impact of the IPO or of the acquisition event. The last two columns of table 
9.6 report the results of a multinomial logit regression where the omitted 
category is ﬁ  rms that have not exited, and the two reported categories are 
ﬁ  rms that have a less competitive (column [4]) or more competitive (column 
[5]) impact. The regressions suggest that there is no statistically signiﬁ  cant 
relationship between the government VC and more competitive exits, but a 
signiﬁ  cant negative relationship between the government VC and less com-
petitive exits.
Overall, these results suggest that while PVCs achieve more exits, this result 
mainly comes from achieving more acquisitions. This makes it diﬃcult to 
assess the full impact on competition. On the one hand, achieving an acqui-
sition is a sign of better enterprise performance. On the other hand, these 
acquired enterprises seem less likely to directly increase market competition. 
Whether or not there are indirect eﬀects on competition, either because 
the threat of new entrants keeps established incumbents more eﬃcient, or 
because acquiring ﬁ  rms can use the acquired units to better compete in the 
market place, remains a question for future research.
13. As a robustness check we also run regressions with a deﬁ  nition based on four- digit NAIC 
or six-  digit NAIC but found that this did not aﬀect the main results.308    James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann
9.6.3      Treatment versus Selection: Using Political 
Leadership as an Instrumental Variable
The results of tables 9.4 through 9.6 provide a rich description of the 
statistical relationship between investor types and enterprise outcomes. In 
general, PVC-  supported enterprises perform better than GVC-  supported 
enterprises. However, as already mentioned, one cannot infer a causal inter-
pretation—that PVC support causes better performance. It is possible, and 
indeed likely, that PVCs simply choose better enterprises than GVCs, given 
their higher (unsubsidized) return threshold. Furthermore, this is exactly 
what we expect if the GVC programs were working eﬀectively as they should 
be funding the “extensive margin”—projects that would not be funded 
by PVCs.
On the other hand, if weaker GVC performance really is a causal or 
treatment eﬀect—that GVCs generate weaker performance from otherwise 
equivalent enterprises—this would lead to a negative assessment of the GVC 
programs. In short, the mere fact that enterprise performance is positively 
correlated with PVCs does not tell us much about whether the GVC pro-
grams are performing eﬀectively.
To address this question we need to isolate the treatment and selection 
eﬀects associated with PVCs (or GVCs). From an econometric point of view, 
this is a classic endogeneity problem. The PVC indicator is not assigned 
randomly but reﬂ  ects likely performance, making it an endogenous regres-
sor. The standard solution to this problem is to use an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach. We need an instrument that is itself exogenous in the sense 
that it is not aﬀected by performance of venture-  supported enterprises (the 
so-  called “exclusion” restriction) but that is correlated with the presence of 
GVC investment In fact, there is a very interesting instrument with these 
properties—the political stance of the provincial government in place in a 
particular period.
In the data, left- leaning governments are associated with additional GVC 
funding and additional GVC investment. They are also associated with 
reduced PVC investment. Accordingly, having a left-  leaning government 
provides an exogenous substitution of GVCs for PVCs. This is exactly what 
we want an instrument to capture. It will capture the eﬀect of exogenous sub-
stitution of GVCs for PVCs on performance of enterprises. It will therefore 
provide a good measure of the “treatment” eﬀect as opposed to the “selec-
tion” eﬀect associated with GVCs. While we would not wish to exaggerate 
the quality of the instrument, the results are at least suggestive and provide 
a better way of distinguishing between selection and treatment eﬀects than 
is otherwise possible.
We construct a “left politics” indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a 
left-  leaning political party held power in the province of the ﬁ  nanced ﬁ  rm 
at the time of its ﬁ  rst investment, and 0 otherwise. A full list of political 
parties that have held seats in any one of the provincial legislatures was Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital    3 0 9
retrieved from Elections Canada, along with number of seats they held and 
the total number of seats available in each year from 1996 to 2005. Each 
party’s self-  declared political ideology was retrieved from Wikipedia. A 
party was determined to be left leaning if it identiﬁ  ed itself as adhering to 
the tenets of “social democracy”, as opposed to liberalism or conservatism. 
As a validity check, we surveyed six economics professors at the University 
of British Columbia, asking them to identify each provincial political party 
as left, center, or right. They had a 77.8 percent agreement with the self-
 identiﬁ  ed ideology-  based classiﬁ  cation, as compared with an expected 37.6 
percent agreement (for a kappa of 0.6436∗∗∗).
For ﬁ  rms without a date of ﬁ  rst investment, we use the average (mode) of 
the binary left-  leaning winner variable over the period 1996 to 2005. This 
approximation does not materially alter any coeﬃcients but does allow us to 
increase the power of the relevant tests. In an unreported robustness check 
we replace the year-  based winner variable with the average winner across 
all years and found broadly similar, perhaps slightly improved, results. The 
diﬀerence could be attributed to the importance of the eﬀect of politics on 
ﬁ  nancing throughout the ﬁ  rm’s life, as compared with at the time of ﬁ  rst 
investment, but also may reﬂ  ect that a single political party may change its 
ideology over time, and so be “left leaning” only on average.
Our instrumental variables approach involves two stages. The ﬁ  rst stage 
regresses the presence of GVCs on the “left- leaning” variable. Since we only 
have a single instrument, we need to combine the GVC and MVC categories 
into a single category, inelegantly called GMVC. The dependent variable 
is thus either GMVC or fraction of GVC. Table 9.7 looks at a number of 
alternative speciﬁ  cations for the ﬁ  rst-  stage regression. The results indicate 
a strong statistical relationship between left-  leaning politics and the rela-
tive importance or presence of GVCs. This result is consistent with casual 
observations. Most important, it justiﬁ  es the use of left politics as an instru-
mental variable. The predicted values from stage 1 then identify exogenous 
changes in GMVC or fraction of GVC variable. The exogenous component 
of the relevant government support variable is used as a regressor to explain 
enterprise performance in the stage 2 regressions.
Table 9.8 reports the results for the (stage 2) IV model. For brevity’s 
sake, we focus on those outcome variables from table 9.4 and 9.5 that we 
would consider economically most important. The results show that once 
we exploit exogenous variation in the availability of government- sponsored 
venture capital, we ﬁ  nd an even stronger negative eﬀect. All the regressions 
that had a negative and signiﬁ  cant eﬀect for GVC continue to do so, typi-
cally at similar or higher levels of statistical signiﬁ  cance. Moreover, two 
of the variables that had insigniﬁ  cant coeﬃcients in tables 9.4 and 9.5 are 
now found to also have negative and statistically signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients. In 
particular, we now ﬁ  nd a negative relationship with survival and with US 
patents. That is, enterprises funded by GVCs are less likely to survive, and 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.312    James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann
This could be the most important result in the chapter. It suggests that 
the negative association between GVCs and enterprise performance is es-
sentially entirely due to a treatment eﬀect—to weaker mentoring or value 
added performance by GVCs as compared with PVCs. Also, while we do not 
emphasize this ﬁ  nding in view of the various data limitations, it also suggests 
that there is little if any selection eﬀect, which in turn suggests that the GVC 
programs are not expanding the extensive margin but instead are competing 
with PVCs for inframarginal products that would be funded in any case.
We emphasize that we do not have as much data as we would like, that 
the instrument might not be as good an instrument as we would like, and 
that there might be alternative explanations of the results. However, to the 
extent that these results can be taken seriously, they do raise serious concerns 
about GVC programs.
9.6.4      Market Expansion versus Crowding Out
Probably the most contentious question about government support of 
venture capital is whether government subsidies increase the size of the mar-
ket, or whether they merely crowd out private investments. Answering this 
question, however, remains a challenge; not only because of data limitations 
but also because a complete answer requires a counterfactual of what would 
have happened with government support. Even though we will be unable to 
provide a complete or even satisfactory answer, we nonetheless report some 
ﬁ  ndings that provide some suggestive and indirect evidence.
First of all, the previous subsection notes two empirical results. First, left-
  leaning governments are associated with additional GVC activity and cor-
respondingly less PVC activity. This in itself suggests that GVC investment 
substitutes for or crowds out PVC investment. Second, the main ﬁ  nding is 
that approximately the entire negative association between GVC and perfor-
mance is due to a treatment eﬀect rather than a selection eﬀect. This is also 
consistent with crowding out as it suggests that GVCs are not adding much 
to the extensive margin (i.e., they are not ﬁ  nancing many new enterprises 
below the PVC threshold for investment).
An interesting question is whether there is complete crowding out; that 
is, whether GVC substitutes for PVC on a one-  to-  one basis. One way of 
addressing this is to look at the total number of investors. The coeﬃcient for 
left politics is positive, but interestingly enough, it is statistically signiﬁ  cant 
only after controlling for industry. Therefore, we perform two additional 
regressions, one for the subsample of high technology ﬁ  rms and one for the 
sample of low technology ﬁ  rms. We note that the coeﬃcient is positive and 
statistically signiﬁ  cant in the high technology subsample but statistically 
insigniﬁ  cant in the low technology subsample. This evidence is thus consis-
tent with the notion that there is partial crowding out for high technology 
enterprises. Moreover, for low technology enterprises we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that there is full crowding out.Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital    3 1 3
As noted before, the analysis of ﬁ  nancing patterns among inframarginal 
ﬁ  rms is useful but certainly incomplete. To get a second perspective on the 
question of whether GVC augments the market versus crowding out PVC, 
we consider the pattern of deal origination. In particular, we ask which 
venture capitalists are relatively more active in ﬁ  rst-  round ﬁ  nancing; i.e., in 
bringing new enterprises into the venture capital market. Table 9.9 provides 
some simple descriptive statistics about origination patterns.
From the perspective of the GVCs, we may ask what fraction of their 
deals were also originated GVCs. This includes all pure GVC deals, as well 
as those MVC deals that were originated by GVCs. One detail is how to 
treat MVC deals that were originated by a mix of PVCs and GVCs (called 
mixed originations or “MixOri” in table 9.9), hence the distinction between 
inclusive and exclusive numbers. Table 9.9 shows that GVCs mostly “self-
  originate,” i.e., they originate almost all of their own deals. Indeed, if we 
include deals with mixed origination, 95 percent of all enterprises by GVCs 
were also originated by GVCs. This pattern is less pronounced for PVCs, 
where that number is 82 percent. Moreover, the pattern of self-  origination 
is more pronounced for low technology rather than high technology deals. 
Another way of looking at the origination patterns is to ask how many deals 
Table 9.9  Patterns of origination






  In  total 3,720 1,226 2,494
    Financed only by PVCs 1,208 414 794
    Financed only by GVCs 1,784 388 1,396
    Financed by a mix of PVCs and GVCs (  mixed) 728 424 304
    Of mixed, originated by PVCs 121 84 37
    Of mixed, originated by GVCs 328 150 178
    Of mixed, originated by a mix of GVCs and PVCs 
  (    MixOri)
194 132 62
    Of mixed, origination unknown 85 58 27
Percent
    Financed by PVCs that were originated by PVCs 
  (incl.  MixOri)
82.28% 80.77% 83.38%
    Financed by GVCs that were originated by GVCs 
  (incl.  MixOri)
95.01% 88.86% 97.79%
    Financed by PVCs that were originated by PVCs 
  (excl.  MixOri)
71.80% 63.85% 77.59%
    Financed by GVCs that were originated by GVCs 
  (excl.  MixOri)
87.02% 71.35% 94.08%
    Originated by PVCs then became mixed 9.10% 16.87% 4.45%
    Originated by GVCs then became mixed   15.53%   27.88%   11.31%
Notes: “Number” stands for number of enterprises; “Percent” stands for fraction of enterprises; “Mix-
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become MVC. That is, among all the deals originated by GVCs, how many 
of them later add a PVC as a coinvestor? Table 9.9 shows that only 9 percent 
of all deals originated by PVCs ever receive any funding from GVCs. The 
percentage of deals originated by GVCs that ever receive any funding from 
PVCs is slightly higher at 15 percent. Moreover, we ﬁ  nd that these percent-
ages are higher for high technology ﬁ  rms.
Table 9.9 suggests that there is a signiﬁ  cant bifurcation in the market that 
relatively few deals are originated by one type of venture capitalist and sub-
sequently ﬁ  nanced by the other. The GVCs seem to be slightly more active 
originators than PVCs, although the diﬀerences do not appear dramatic. 
Another interesting ﬁ  nding is that the segmentation of the market appears 
more dramatic in the low technology segment than in the high technology 
segment. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that GVCs may 
be contributing to a moderate market expansion, especially for high tech-
nology ﬁ  rms. In the low technology segment, however, the market appears 
to be particularly segmented.
The evidence so far suggests that while there is considerable evidence 
for segmentation and crowding out, there is also some evidence for market 
expansion. We may also want to ask to what extent the additional ﬁ  rms 
brought into the market by GVCs perform on the various outcome measures. 
We already saw that enterprises funded by GVCs perform worse on average 
for many outcome variables. The question remains whether among the enter-
prises that received funding from both GVCs and PVCs there are systematic 
diﬀerences according to whether the enterprise was originated by GVCs or 
PVCs. In an unreported regression we explored origination patterns focusing 
on the MVC subsample. No strong patterns emerged; that is, the coeﬃcients 
for the diﬀerent types of originators were almost all insigniﬁ  cant.14
One additional step of our analysis was to examine whether there are 
systematic diﬀerences between the two main types of subsidies provided 
by the federal government. Most of the government-  sponsored venture 
capital funds fall under the so-  called “Labor-  sponsored” programs, which 
beneﬁ  t from a mix of provincial and federal subsidies. The purely federal 
government-  sponsored venture capital comes from the largest Canadian 
government- owned development bank, called the BDC. In additional unre-
ported regressions we examined whether enterprises funded by the BDC per-
formed systematically diﬀerently from the other GVCs. The coeﬃcients were 
generally statistically insigniﬁ  cant (though positive), suggesting that there 
are no systematic diﬀerences between Labor- sponsored and BDC- sponsored 
enterprises. The only exceptions were for the presence of US investors and 
for the number of Canadian patents, where the BDC coeﬃcient was positive 
14. The only exceptions worth mentioning are that the presence of a government originator 
is associated with fewer US investors but more US patents. We remain slightly at loss for an 
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and statistically signiﬁ  cant. This may be an indication of the investment poli-
cies of the BDC: to foster relationships with US investors and to ﬁ  le patents 
in Canada (although not in the United States).
A concern that is closely related to crowding out is that the presence of 
GVCs might reduce the return to PVCs. If GVCs are simply competing with 
PVCs for the same projects, this might have the eﬀect of reducing the return 
to PVCs. We therefore regressed the exit value of enterprises supported by 
PVCs on the share of enterprises supported by GVCs in a speciﬁ  c province 
in a particular year. We refer to this variable as the GVC deal fraction. We 
consider the exit value for enterprises funded purely by PVCs, as well as the 
exit values for the combination of private and mixed venture capital. The 
results presented in table 9.10 control for the quality of a venture using 
the total number of funds that participated in its ﬁ  nancing.
The results are interesting but not compelling. It appears that the presence 
of a larger share of GVC activity lowers the exits values associated with 
enterprises with mixed PVC and GVC support, but has no statistically sig-
niﬁ  cant or economically meaningful eﬀect on exit values of enterprises with 
pure PVC support. Thus, if there is crowding out, it does not seem to have 
an eﬀect on the exit values of purely privately supported enterprises.
9.7    Concluding  Remarks
In this chapter we assess the relative performance of private venture 
capital and government-  sponsored venture capital in Canada. We focus on 
three general areas of performance: value creation, competitive eﬀects, and 
innovation. We do not undertake a full welfare analysis but, presumably, 
these three objectives are closely associated with economic welfare. Overall, 
Table 9.10  Exit values for PVCs and mixed VCs
Sample   PVCs only   Mixed only   Both
GVC deal fraction 0.187 –7.86 –1.89
(0.16) (–4.03)∗∗∗ (–2.06)∗∗
Number of invested funds 0.36 0.08 0.15
(2.12)∗∗ (0.98) (2.53)∗∗
Indicator variable
  Year  ﬁ  xed eﬀects yes yes yes
  Industry  ﬁ  xed eﬀects yes yes yes
Constant 1.99 7.23 3.11
(1.15) (3.99)∗∗∗ (2.77)∗∗∗
R2 0.10 0.10 0.08
Number of observations   1,177   716   1,893
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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it appears that there is a consistent pattern of superior performance for 
PVCs. Speciﬁ  cally, enterprises supported by private venture capital are more 
likely to have successful exits (IPOs or third-  party acquisitions) and tend to 
generate higher value conditional on successful exit. The expected commer-
cial value of an enterprise ﬁ  nanced by private venture capital (PVC) is sig-
niﬁ  cantly higher than for an enterprise ﬁ  nanced by government-  sponsored 
venture capital (GVC). In addition, PVC- ﬁ  nanced enterprises are less likely 
to go out of business over relevant time horizons and are more likely to 
attract US investment.
The eﬀects on competition are less conclusive. On the one hand there 
is clear evidence that PVCs are associated with a greater likelihood of an 
IPO on a senior exchange (the TSE, NYSE, or NASDAQ), and GVCs with 
IPOs on junior exchanges (mainly the TSX-  VN). This suggests that PVCs 
may generate more competitiveness. However, PVCs are also associated with 
more mergers and acquisitions, including by industry insiders, which may 
be considered as less competitive outcomes. There also appears to be some 
evidence of diﬀerential impacts on innovation. Relative to GVCs, enterprises 
funded by PVC ﬁ  nance operate more often in high-  technology industries. 
They also show a greater propensity to patent.
Putting these three areas together—value creation, competition, and 
innovation—it appears that enterprises supported by private venture capi-
tal have overall superior performance. These results are signiﬁ  cant even 
though it is diﬃcult to obtain suﬃcient data at a precise enough level to draw 
strong inferences. In principle, it would be desirable to have data about the 
actual investment provided to each venture by the diﬀerent types of venture 
capitalists, but insuﬃcient information of this type is available. Given the 
available information, we ﬁ  nd our results to be strongly suggestive, albeit 
far from deﬁ  nitive.
If we accept the apparent fact that enterprises ﬁ  nanced by private venture 
capital exhibit better performance, on average, than enterprises ﬁ  nanced by 
government-  sponsored venture capital, the next question concerns policy 
implications.
In section 9.3 we outlined a set of observable performance measures that 
would shed light on whether the GVC programs were providing valuable 
policy contributions. Abbreviated versions of these “observables” and the 
actual ﬁ  ndings are described in the following.
1. It should not be surprising if GVC-  supported enterprises exhibit 
lower private performance than PVC-  supported enterprises. This would be 
expected under a well-  designed program.
In fact, GVC-  supported enterprises do exhibit weaker “private” perfor-
mance as measured by the frequency of successful exits, exit values, and 
survivorship than PVC-  supported enterprises but, as noted, this is not it-
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2.  If the external (i.e., nonprivate) eﬀects of GVC-  supported enterprises 
fall short of PVC-  supported enterprises, this raises questions about the 
eﬀectiveness of these programs.
While we cannot measure external beneﬁ  ts directly, we believe that the in-
novation process is characterized by positive externalities and we therefore 
take patents as an indicator of innovation externalities. The patent itself of 
course acts a property right to convert potential external beneﬁ  ts to private 
beneﬁ  ts, but we still expect that some additional externalities are also gen-
erated. A second external beneﬁ  t relates to increased competition. On both 
these measures, PVCs perform somewhat better than GVCs.
3.  The extent of crowding out is very important. If GVCs appear to be 
crowding out private venture capital, this would undermine any positive 
impact of those programs.
We ﬁ nd suggestive evidence of at least some crowding out.
4.  If GVCs have weaker private performance than PVCs this could be due 
to either selection or treatment (or both). A poor program would be charac-
terized by a large negative treatment eﬀect and a small selection eﬀect.
We use an instrumental variables approach to separate the treatment eﬀect 
from the selection eﬀect. While the results are far from deﬁ  nitive, we ﬁ  nd 
suggestive evidence that the poorer performance of the GVC-  supported 
enterprises is due to treatment rather than selection. In other words, enter-
prises supported by GVCs appear to perform more poorly than otherwise 
equivalent enterprises supported by PVCs.
On the whole, our conclusions cast doubt on the eﬀectiveness of 
government-  sponsored venture capital programs in supporting strongly-
 performing enterprises. There are, however, some additional considerations 
that should be kept in mind. One consideration is a potential “training eﬀect” 
of GVC programs. Individual fund managers are typically less experienced 
and less well paid in the GVC sector than in the PVC sector. Furthermore, 
individuals sometimes move from the GVC sector to the PVC sector, but 
rarely move the other way. Thus, one additional beneﬁ  t of GVC programs 
might lie in providing training for venture capitalists. However, it is also 
possible that the weaker performance of GVCs might be related to other 
personnel issues. In particular, success in the GVC sector might lie par-
tially in good lobbying skills and good “government relations skills” rather 
than in good mentoring of enterprises. It is also likely that the “survivor” 
principle—good fund managers are retained and poor managers are ﬁ  red 
or reassigned—operates more vigorously in the private sector.
Notwithstanding our ﬁ  ndings casting doubt on GVC programs, it must 
be acknowledged that there have been some tremendous successes. Possibly 
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in Motion” (RIM), the developer of the BlackBerry Internet communica-
tions device. The external beneﬁ  ts of this one success would cover the costs 
of at least a portion of the GVC support in Canada. More broadly, it does 
not follow from our analysis that government support for venture capital 
has been unsuccessful. Even if some of the government-  sponsored venture 
capital increases the number of ﬁ  rms funded, it remains important to assess 
whether the beneﬁ  ts of such investment exceed the costs. Given the market 
failures associated with venture capital ﬁ  nance and with innovation, it is 
quite possible that government subsidies to venture capital to oﬀset these 
market failures are important, but a full rate of return or cost- beneﬁ  t assess-
ment of such subsidies would need to be undertaken. We would view our 
analysis as a ﬁ  rst step in the direction of a full policy analysis. Still, our 
unique data-  collection methods allow us to examine data that is consider-
ably more complete than previous studies of Canadian venture capital and 
the overall analysis provides some cautionary notes about the alleged ben-
eﬁ  ts of government-  sponsored venture capital.
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